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A Veto on General Sleiman
Al-Hayat, UK,
December 13, 2007
By
Hassan Haidar
The 14 March
alliance showed impressive political maturity when it
nominated General Michel Sleiman for the presidency,
especially when taking into consideration the alliance's
recent formation, the diversity of forces it includes, and
the massive political and security pressures that it has
been exposed to and which it still survives.
Moreover, by
embracing this choice, the alliance proved its ability to
foresee whatever plots are in the making for Lebanon through
paralyzing its constitutional institutions one after the
other through various means: resignation, shutting down, or
the void. These two elements, maturity and the ability to
foresee, have stirred anxiety among those who do not wish
for the independence-oriented alliance to make any use of
its accomplishments, especially ending the mandate period,
the setting of the fundamentals of Lebanon's relations with
other Arab countries particularly its direct neighbors, and
the attempt to pull Lebanon out of the whirls of regional
and international conflicts.
The response
did not take long to materialize. It came in the form of
assassinating chief of operations in the Lebanese army,
General Francois Hajj, known for his closeness to Army
Commander General Sleiman and his preferred candidate to
take over his post as army commander. The assassination made
it clear that a certain side has caste a veto against
Sleiman's election as president.
The message was
delivered by undermining the unanimous support enjoyed by
the army through involving it in the divisive strife and by
preventing Sleiman's election as an opportunity for a new
start that prevents any side from exercising the potential
to impose political or constitutional paralysis. The
assassination came particularly after word was out that the
president-to-be - in addition to his close ties with the
military establishment whose unity he has preserved over
three years of political and security tensions - would enjoy
significant presence both at the parliamentary and
ministerial level to secure conciliation, retrieve balance
to institutions and eliminate the need for the "obstructing
third" for one or the other side.
The
assassination of Hajj also implies that there are also
those, both inside and outside Lebanon, who believer that
the compromise offered by the parliamentary majority by
accepting constitutional amendment to end the void,
represents the beginning of its defeat, hence warranting the
need to continue the battle to force it to make more
concessions, an objective best accomplishable by further
delaying the presidential elections and maintaining the
ongoing threat of a presidential void and its consequences
in terms of economic and security deterioration. By the same
token, the same sides believe that if the majority has taken
responsibility and decided to sacrifice by dropping the
option of electing a president by absolute majority and by
giving in to amending the constitution to save the country,
why not force it to make more concessions?
Just yesterday,
French President Nicholas Sarkozy expressed his willingness
to visit Damascus if conciliatory presidential elections
were held, if the assassinations stopped in Lebanon, and if
Syria did not attempt to block the work of the international
tribunal. Ultimately, these conditions are subject to
modification, especially since Damascus has a proven record
in negotiating over Lebanon and in finding the right
circumstances to do so.
Perhaps some
were expecting that the assassination would trigger a
different response from deputy Michel Aoun who repeatedly
asserts his roots in the military establishment although
that did not stop him from opposing the army commander's bid
for the presidency. However, instead of maintaining his
silence, at least out of respect for his slain comrade, as
usual he "messed up" in haste by defending Syria and
accusing Siniora's government that it could not be distanced
from the assassination! |
